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There are surely limits on the tolerance of foreign investors for in-
creased claims on the United States.[......]International debt accu-
mulation at these rates cannot go on forever.[......]As a matter of
arithmetic, any reduction in the U.S. current account decit must be
matched by reductions in current account surpluses elsewhere.
Lawrence H. Summers, Per Jacobsson Lecture, 2004.
1 Introduction
The recent debate about the desirability of a new world monetary system1
has been motivated in large part by the perception that the existing system
has contributed to the development of large current account imbalances that
are costly to the surplus countries and therefore ultimately unsustainable. As
discussed in Cook and Yetman (2011), Adams and Park (2009), Park (2007) and
Dooley et al. (2004) in the context of developing Asia2 , part of their cost is due
to the fact that the current account surpluses have led to explosive central bank
foreign exchange accumulation, to the point that reserves now exceed, often by
a wide margin, what is required for liquidity purposes or as an insurance device
against sudden reversals in capital inows (Flood and Marion (2002), Jeanne
and Rancière (2006), Rodrik (2006), Summers (2006), Jeanne (2007), Alfaro and
Kanczuk (2009) and Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2010)).3 As the reserve
assets are low-yielding, with insu¢ cient alternatives available on the required
scale, this has large opportunity costs for the surplus countries. Rodrik (2006)
1Calls for changes have been made by, among others, Russia (BBC, 2009) and China
(Bloomberg, 2009).
2Other countries have also experienced a massive increase in foreign exchange reserves since
the late 1990s (Rodrik, 2006).
3Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2010) point out that the fear of a sudden ight from
domestic to foreign assets implies that the demand for international reserves should be pro-
portional to M2, and that this can explain observed reserves in many emerging markets well
during their sample, which ends in 2004. However, they nd that in the last years of their
sample a substantial fraction of Chinas reserves was left unexplained. Since that time Chinese
reserves have more than quadrupled.
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estimates the cost of reserves as the spread between the cost of private sector
short-term foreign borrowing and the yield on the Central Banks holdings of
liquid foreign assets. This spread equals several percentage points in normal
times, resulting in a social cost of reserve accumulation of close to 1 percent
of GDP for many developing countries. Similarly, Hauner (2005) estimates an
opportunity cost of international reserves of 0.2-0.6 percent of GDP in emerging
countries.
In light of these di¢ culties, some central banks are looking for policy alterna-
tives that curtail reserve accumulation and that rebalance demand and growth
towards domestic sources.4 The policy relevance of this concern with reserve
levels is vividly illustrated by the recent experiences of China.
On March 20, 2007 Chinas central bank governor announced that his coun-
try would stop accumulating foreign exchange reserves. He was quoted in
Reuters (2007) as stating foreign exchange reserves in China are large enough.
We do not intend to go further and accumulate reserves.As shown in Figure
1, this statement followed several years of very large and accelerating Chinese
reserve gains. The central bank did not follow through on the statement and
kept accumulating reserves throughout 2007. But in all subsequent debates this
option has never been completely o¤ the table. In 2009, as illustrated in Figure
2, Chinas reserve accumulation attened out temporarily, with the country cut-
ting its holdings of U.S. treasury securities by the sharpest amount in a decade
around the end of 2009.5 More recently, in an April 2011 speech at Tsinghua
University, the central bank governor reiterated that China is making strong ef-
forts to scale back its foreign exchange reserves, as over-accumulation of reserves
leads to excess liquidity. In his view, Chinas reserves have already surpassed
4This need for a rebalancing of demand has also been stressed in IMFs policy advice in
recent years. See International Monetary Fund (2005, 2009) for examples, where the latter
mentions the need for emerging Asia to rebalance its demand towards domestic sources.
5See South China Morning Post (Feb 18, 2010).
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the reasonable needs of China.6
This reects an o¢ cial concern that an existing policy regime may not be
sustainable because it involves the accumulation of too much foreign exchange,
certainly well in excess of anything that could be deemed socially optimal, either
by the literature on optimal reserves or by policymakersown assessments. At
some point in time, which apparently has not yet been reached by China, the
concern of the authorities may lead to stronger action in the form of decisive
policies that impose an upper bound on reserves, and the public may then come
to believe that these policies are indeed credible. The question, on which there
has so far been very little work in the literature, is what this would imply for
macroeconomic variables. This paper attempts to answer that question.
We suggest that it is useful to examine the theoretical implications of pol-
icy responses to excessive reserve accumulation through the lens of a familiar
literature - the literature on rst-generation balance of payments crises follow-
ing Krugman (1979), Calvo (1987), the survey in Calvo and Vegh (1999), and
Kumhof, Li and Yan (2007), which studies balance of payments crises under
ination targeting regimes. The critical di¤erence between our paper and that
literature is that in the latter the concern is with countries that experience the
consequences of a central bank owning too little foreign exchange while our pa-
per studies countries that accumulate what they perceive to be too much foreign
exchange.
What these countries could then experience as reserves approach an upper
limit is what we will refer to as a balance of payments anti-crisis. We will
discuss that the upper limit is not arbitrary because the maximum possible
limit is determined by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. We
adopt the terminology anti-crisis because in terms of the dynamics of foreign
6See the Chinese version of the Wall Street Journal (April 19, 2011), available at
http://chinese.wsj.com/BIG5/20110419/bch071424.asp.
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exchange reserves it represents the opposite of a traditional balance of payments
crisis. But it nevertheless represents a crisis in that it ends in the collapse of the
previous monetary regime. This however is accompanied by another outcome
that is desired by the authorities, a rebalancing of demand towards domestic
sources.
In this paper we focus on the e¤ects of such anti-crises on the domestic econ-
omy. We therefore study this problem in the context of a small open economy,
without emphasizing the global repercussions. We assume that a central bank,
similar to the Chinese announcements of 2007 and 2011, declares that it will
continue accumulating reserves only up to an upper limit that is not too far
above the existing level.7 To account for the fact that the countries concerned
may be pursuing a variety of di¤erent monetary regimes, we examine the cases
of exchange rate targeting, CPI ination targeting and domestic (nontradables)
ination targeting.
We assume that the event that ultimately leads to an anti-crisis is a favorable
shock to the government budget. Specically, we assume that the government
starts to receive an additional tradables endowment equal to 1% of GDP, which
leads to exponential growth in reserves.8 This could for example represent the
favorable scal consequences of higher productivity in the tradables sector. The
policy response analyzed in this paper resembles the Chinese announcements of
2007 and 2011 - a government announcement that it will stop reserve accumu-
lation at some maximum, regardless of the consequences for the sustainability
of the monetary regime.
7 In terms of describing pre-crisis dynamics, it is in fact su¢ cient to assume that markets
perceive this intention or necessity on the part of the central bank. Adding uncertainty about
the upper limit would change some details but not the main features of pre-crisis dynamics.
8According to the o¢ cial data, scal surpluses were not the main driver of reserve accu-
mulation for China. However, the o¢ cial data may be misleading due to, for example, the
manner in which they account for public enterprises. In a World Bank empirical study, Kuijs
(2005) nds that (The Chinese) Government saving is remarkably high compared to other
countries, and is much higher than suggested by the headline scal data.
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We show that this is enough to balance the budget endogenously if reserves
are not already too large. Under ination targeting, the announcement causes
downward pressure on exchange rate depreciation, with goods and money de-
mand increasing in an accelerating fashion due to the resulting reduction in
inationary distortions. The increase in real money demand, to the extent
that it is accommodated by nominal money issuance in exchange for foreign
currency, causes a nal burst of reserve accumulation, the anti-crisis. Under
ination targeting this crisis is continuous while under exchange rate targeting
it is instantaneous. The reserve gains are fastest, and the anti-crisis therefore
happens earliest, under monetary regimes that imply the strongest commitment
to intervene in foreign exchange markets by issuing money against foreign ex-
change, and therefore the strongest commitment against letting the nominal
exchange rate appreciate. The ranking of regimes in terms of reserve gains
is therefore, from fastest to slowest, exchange rate targeting followed by CPI
ination targeting and domestic ination targeting.
For the government the e¤ect of lower exchange rate depreciation is a re-
duction in seigniorage income that balances the budget. The point at which
this happens is not arbitrary, because by uncovered interest parity exchange
rate depreciation cannot drop arbitrarily low without violating the zero lower
bound on nominal interest rates. We will therefore assume that the upper limit
for reserves announced by the government is just below the maximum level of
reserves at which lower seigniorage can still balance the budget.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model.
Section 3 discusses model calibration and the solution algorithm. Section 4
discusses the dynamics of balance of payments anti-crises. Section 5 concludes.
Technical details and a description of the solution algorithm are contained in
the Technical Appendix accompanying the paper.
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2 The Model
The economy consists of a government, a representative household, and rep-
resentative tradables and nontradables producing rms. Real interest rates
and international goods prices are exogenous and constant, and the latter are
normalized to one. Purchasing power parity holds for tradable goods, while
nontradables prices are exible.
2.1 Households
Households maximize lifetime utility derived from their consumption of trad-
able goods cTt , nontradable goods c
N
t , and leisure 1   ht, where 1 is the time
endowment and ht is hours worked or labor supply. The CES consumption ag-
gregator is ct, the elasticity of substitution between cTt and c
N
t is denoted by ,
and the quasi-share parameter of tradables is . The personal discount rate is
assumed to equal the constant real international interest rate r. We have the
optimization problem
Max
Z 1
0
[ ln ct + (1  ) ln(1  ht)] e rtdt ; (1)
ct =


1
 (cTt )
 1
 + (1  ) 1 (cNt )
 1

 
 1
: (2)
Labor is remunerated at the real wage rate wt = Wt=Et, where Wt is the
nominal wage rate and Et is the nominal exchange rate. Wages are equalized
across the two sectors. Households own xed capital stocks kT and kN with real
returns rk
T
t and r
kN
t . They also receive lump-sum transfers gt from the govern-
ment. Financial assets include nominal domestic currency money balances Mt,
real international bonds bt with constant real return r, and domestic currency
government bonds Qt, for which there is complete home bias, with nominal
return it. The no-arbitrage condition between domestic and foreign currency
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denominated bonds, or uncovered interest parity, is given by
it = r + "t ; (3)
where "t = _Et=Et. Foreign and domestic currency denominated bonds are there-
fore perfect substitutes, and we can simplify further by assuming that domestic
government bonds are in zero net supply at all times. Total real nancial as-
sets are then given by at = bt +mt, where mt = Mt=Et. After imposing the
transversality condition lim
t!1ate
 rt  0, householdslifetime budget constraint
can be written as
a0+
Z 1
0

wtht + r
kT
t k
T + rk
N
t k
N + gt

e rtdt 
Z 1
0

cTt +
cNt
et
+ itmt

e rtdt ;
(4)
where et = Et=PNt is the relative price of tradables, and P
N
t is the nominal
price of nontradables. There is a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption
mt  

cTt +
cNt
et

: (5)
We will assume and later verify that this constraint holds with equality at all
times, which must be true as long as it > 0 8t. The household maximizes (1)
and (2) subject to (4) and (5), taking as given
n
wt; r
kT
t ; r
kN
t ; gt; Et; P
N
t
o1
t=0
.
The multiplier of the lifetime budget constraint (4) is given by . Then the
optimality conditions are (4) and (5) holding with equality, and the following
rst-order conditions:
cTt =


1  

cNt
et

; (6)
1  
1  ht = wt : (7)
We can also derive the following condition relating aggregate consumption Ct
to aggregate labor supply ht (see the Technical Appendix):
wcpit =
Wt
Pt
=
1  

Ct(1 + it)
1  ht : (8)
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The consumption based price index Pt is given by
Pt =

 (Et)
1 
+ (1  )  PNt 1  11  : (9)
Letting t = _Pt=Pt and Nt = _P
N
t =P
N
t we also have the following relationship
between ination rates:
t
 
e1 t + (1  )

= e1 t "t + (1  )Nt : (10)
2.2 Firms
The production functions of tradables and nontradables manufacturing rms
are given by
yTt =
 
kT
T  
hTt
1 T
; (11)
yNt =
 
kN
N  
hNt
1 N
; (12)
where hTt and h
N
t are the respective labor inputs. Prot maximization implies
standard rst order conditions for labor.
2.3 Government
The government receives a ow endowment of tradable goods fdtg1t=0 that is
normalized to zero in the initial steady state. Government policy consists of
a specication of the path of lump-sum transfers fgtg1t=0 and of a monetary
policy rule. For the latter we consider exchange rate targeting, CPI ination
targeting and domestic ination targeting. The initial target ination rates un-
der the respective regimes are denoted by ",  and N . These target growth
rates are assumed to have been consistent with scal solvency under a previous
path of endowments and transfers. However, after the arrival of information at
time 0 about a more favorable path of endowments fdtg1t=0, they become too
high to prevent ongoing foreign exchange reserve accumulation that would be
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unbounded without an ultimate change of policy. The eventual steady state tar-
get nominal growth rates will be determined by a balanced budget requirement
for the government.
For each of the three monetary regimes, we assume that central bank accom-
modation of changes in real money demand at time 0 ensures a smooth path of
the targeted price variable. Exchange rate targeting is therefore fully dened
by a continuous target path for the nominal anchor:
Et = E0e
"t : (13)
For ination targeting, we follow the literature in assuming that the central
bank follows a nominal interest rate rule that responds to deviations of ination
from its target. But we replace ination deviations with deviations of the price
path from its targeted path. This avoids indeterminacy under exible prices.
The target price paths ~Pt and ~PNt are formulated as in (13). Furthermore, the
nominal interest rate is raised one for one with the current rate of exchange rate
depreciation. For CPI ination targeting, we therefore have the rule
iPt = r + "t + 
P (Pt   ~Pt) ; P > 0 ; (14)
~Pt = P0e
t ; (15)
and similarly for domestic ination targeting
iPNt = r + "t + 
PN (PNt   ~PNt ) ; PN > 0 ; (16)
~PNt = P
N
0 e
N t : (17)
Let xt be the governments foreign exchange reserves. Then its budget con-
straint is
_xt = rxt + _mt + "tmt + dt   gt = rxt + tmt + dt   gt ; (18)
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where tmt is the amount of seigniorage collected by the central bank. At
times of discrete upward jumps in real money balances between t  and t, we
can decompose that jump as mt = mMt +m
E
t > 0. Here m
M
t are jumps
in real money balances that are due to jumps in nominal money balances, that
is, mMt = (Mt Mt )=Et, while mEt are jumps in real money balances that
are due to downward jumps in the nominal exchange rate, that is, mEt =
Mt  (1=Et   1=Et ). The former are associated with central bank acquisition
of foreign exchange, so that xt  xt  = mMt , but the latter are not associated
with changes in foreign exchange reserves. There is a similar decomposition
for continuous increases in real money balances _mt = tmt   "tmt > 0 around
the time of the anti-crisis. Real money balances can increase either through an
increase of the nominal money supply (tmt > 0) or through nominal exchange
rate appreciation alone ("tmt < 0). These two e¤ects can be shown to be
substitutes  ceteris paribus, a faster expansion in nominal money balances
slows down the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
The government may at any time announce a maximum level of foreign
exchange reserves beyond which it will stop reserve accumulation and instead
allow the rate of exchange rate depreciation to adjust. This maximum level is
not relevant before time 0, when the government budget is balanced. But when
the scal revenue shock hits at time 0 we assume that an upper limit for reserves
x is part of the announced government policy package. We have
xt  x 8t : (19)
In addition we impose the transversality condition lim
t!1 (xt  mt) e
 rt = 0 to
obtain the governments innite horizon budget constraint from (18) as follows:
x0 +
Z 1
0
(itmt + dt   gt) e rtdt = m0 : (20)
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2.4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, households and rms maximize their objective functions, the
government follows the policy rules set out in the previous subsection, and
labor and goods markets clear:
ht = h
T
t + h
N
t ; (21)
cNt = y
N
t : (22)
Combining (4) and (20), and denoting the economys overall net foreign assets
by ft = bt + xt, the economys overall resource constraint can then be derived
as
f0 +
Z 1
0
 
yTt + dt

e rtdt =
Z 1
0
cTt e
 rtdt ; (23)
with current account
_ft = rft + y
T
t + dt   cTt : (24)
Furthermore, for the two ination targeting regimes, in equilibrium it must be
true that iPt = it and i
PN
t = it. Together with the uncovered interest parity
condition (3) this implies
Pt = P0e
t ; (25)
PNt = P
N
0 e
N t : (26)
These are analogous to equation (13) for exchange rate targeting, and amount
to exact price level targeting.
2.5 Government Revenue Shock
Assume that the economy is in an initial steady state (subscript ss) with con-
stant net foreign assets fss, foreign exchange reserves xss, endowment ow dss,
and with a balanced budget. In this steady state all rates of price change are
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equal to the initial target growth rate of the nominal anchor. We assume that
fss = 0 and "ss = ss = Nss = 0. Therefore the budget is simply
gss   dss = rxss : (27)
For simplicity we assume that dss = 0. Now assume that the government
experiences a permanent increase in its endowment ow from dss to d at time
0, with g = gss, but that it keeps the target growth rate of its nominal anchor
at 0 under all three monetary regimes. We therefore have g   d < rxss. By
(18) this generates an accumulation of foreign exchange reserves that would
ultimately be unbounded in the absence of the constraint (19). The constraint
therefore becomes binding within nite time  . At that time the monetary
regime collapses in an anti-crisis, and the economy reaches its nal (subscript
) steady state. The time  is endogenous. Given that the constraint (19) is
binding for all t   , the budget must be balanced through lower seigniorage
income from that time onwards,
g   d = rx+ "m ; (28)
where " < 0. It is shown in the Technical Appendix that under CPI and
domestic ination targeting "t must be continuous for all t > 0 including  .
As in the traditional balance-of-payments crisis literature, the crisis is made
inevitable by the inexibility of other scal instruments, in this case an inability
to change transfers su¢ ciently to o¤set the change in the endowment, combined
with an exogenous limit on reserves. In both cases it is recognized that these
assumptions are ad-hoc, but that at the same time they may be realistic as a
description of certain countries, and that the model should therefore be judged
on whether it provides useful predictions for the behavior of key variables. For
the traditional literature this has certainly been the case. For the mechanism
outlined in our paper the same could come to happen if the situation in China
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ever develops to the point where the policy announcements concerning reserves
are followed by decisive policy action that makes them credible in the eyes of
the public. As in our model, China has been unable to stop the accumulation of
reserves through the use of other scal instruments, as evidenced by continued
albeit slowed reserve growth in 2009 despite an unprecedented scal stimulus
package in the same year.
3 Model Solution
3.1 Parameter Values
Where available, parameters are calibrated based on Chinese data. Other para-
meter values are assigned based on the literature for developing countries. The
time unit for calibration of stock-ow ratios is a quarter.
As is common in the monetary business cycle literature, we assume a value of
3% per annum (p.a.) for the real international interest rate r. Given our assump-
tion of zero initial ination, the nominal interest rate iss therefore also equals
3% p.a. The inverse velocity  is set equal to the average ratio of the real mone-
tary base to quarterly output in China over the period 2000Q1 through 2007Q4,
implying  = 1:55. The quasi-share parameter for tradables consumption  is
set equal to  = 0:5, while the elasticity of substitution between tradables and
nontradables is  = 0:5, based on the evidence discussed in Mendoza (2005).
Several of the remaining parameters are calibrated based on a normalization
of output and asset stocks in the initial steady state. We normalize fss = 0,
yss = c

ss = 1 and yss = css = 1. By (6), and given our choice of  = 0:5,
this implies an initial relative price of tradables ess = 1. This in turn implies
that the initial share of tradables in consumption is equal to 0.5 in our baseline.
The proportion of time spent working in the initial steady state is hss = 1=3.
Labor income shares are assumed to equal 60%, by setting T = N = 0:4. As
for the price variables, the initial CPI price level is normalized to one, Pss = 1.
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Then the formula for the CPI determines the price levels PN and E, and the
cash-in-advance constraint determines the levels of real and nominal balances.
Initial ination rates are set to zero, and initial central bank net foreign
exchange reserves xss are set equal to Chinas average ratio of net foreign ex-
change reserves to annual output in 2006, which equals 22%. Because initial
annual output equals 8, this implies xss = 0:22 8 = 1:76. Government trans-
fers are set equal to the interest earnings on these reserves so as to balance the
budget by (27), which requires gss = 0:0132. The new and permanently higher
government tradables endowment is assumed to be d = 0:02, which equals 1% of
overall output and 2% of tradables output. Finally, the upper limit on foreign
exchange reserves is xed at 24% of initial annual output, or x = 1:92. This
means that the higher endowment alone would take reserves to their upper limit
within eight quarters. In practice the limit will be reached faster because of a
combination of compound interest and increases in money demand at time 0
and during the anti-crisis.
3.2 Solution Method
To compute the paths of all variables we adopt a nested shooting algorithm
for the CPI and domestic ination targeting cases, because these cases involve
complicated transitions to a new steady state. The general strategy is to iterate
over the marginal value of lifetime wealth  and the initial exchange rate jump
"0 to ensure that, given the policy announced at time 0, equilibrium paths
satisfy both the economys overall resource constraint (23) and the governments
lifetime budget constraint (20), the latter combined with the upper bound on
foreign exchange reserves (19). The steps of the algorithm are described in detail
in the Technical Appendix.9
9Computation of the exchange rate targeting case is much simpler, as it involves simple
step paths for all variables. Details are also provided in the Technical Appendix.
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4 Anti-Crises
Figure 3 presents solution paths for our policy experiment, with broken lines
denoting exchange rate targeting (ET), solid lines denoting CPI ination tar-
geting (CPIT), and dotted lines denoting domestic ination targeting (DIT).
For most variables the plots show percent deviations from their initial steady
state values, except for ratios to GDP, which are shown in percentage point
deviations from their original steady state values, interest and ination rates,
which are shown in percent per annum, and foreign exchange reserves, which
are shown in levels.
The three monetary regimes share a number of features. At time 0, house-
holds learn that the government will receive a permanently higher endowment
of tradables equal to 1% of the initial GDP. They know through the policy
announcement that this windfall will not be shared with them immediately by
way of higher transfers, but instead will be shared over their lifetimes by way of
lower ination, after an initial period in which the government saves the extra
revenue without a signicant reduction in ination.
This pattern, as seen in Figure 3a, has two e¤ects on household behavior.
First, there is an immediate positive wealth e¤ect as households anticipate fu-
ture benets by consuming more and working less today. Second, when ination
eventually does decline, households increase consumption even further. But this
is due to a reduction in inationary distortions rather than a further wealth ef-
fect. This means that at that time, to satisfy the extra demand, labor supply
actually rises to slightly above its original level. In the long run, both consump-
tion and labor are therefore above their initial steady state values. This reects
not only the positive endowment shock and the foreign asset accumulation ex-
perienced during the transition, but also the smaller inationary distortions in
the new steady state. The end result is a rebalancing of demand towards do-
mestic sources rather than exports, which is reected in a closing of the current
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account surplus gap. This type of rebalancing is exactly what IMF policy advice
in recent years has been recommending to China, see footnote 4.
The details of the dynamics of anti-crises under the three monetary regimes
di¤er in that they happen instantaneously under exchange rate targeting, while
under ination targeting they happen continuously over a period of one to two
quarters. This di¤erence is best understood in terms of the time proles of
the inationary distortions. By equations (8) and (3), the key variable is the
rate of exchange rate depreciation "t. Under exchange rate targeting this is
held constant by the central bank, both before and, at a di¤erent level, after
 . There is therefore a discrete reduction in distortions and thus an increase
in real variables at time  . Under ination targeting, "t becomes endogenous
and, as shown in the Technical Appendix, continuous after time 0. Inationary
distortions are therefore allowed to increase in a gradual fashion before time  .
As a result, all real variables approach their post-crisis values in a continuous
fashion.
Both consumption and production patterns depend on the evolution of the
relative price of tradables e, which falls both initially and again later during the
anti-crisis. The reason is that households now demand more of all goods, but
unlike tradables, nontradables are not in perfectly elastic supply. This drives
up their relative price, which helps to stimulate additional production as real
wages fall in terms of nontradables and rise in terms of tradables. This causes
employment to move to the nontradables sector, as illustrated in Figure 3b.
The nal outcome is a Dutch disease phenomenon, as non-endowment tradables
output falls by about one third of the increase in the tradables endowment (0.7%
versus 2% of initial tradables output).
Comparing tradables consumption and output in Figure 3a, we observe that
the initial gap between the two equals less than half of the increase in the
endowment. This is because prior to the anti-crisis the endowment supports
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mostly additional reserve accumulation rather than additional consumption. As
a result the country at this stage starts to run a current account surplus equal to
around 0.4% of GDP. But during the anti-crisis consumption increases sharply as
inationary distortions are eliminated, and in the nal steady state the current
account is again balanced. At this stage the gap between tradables consumption
and output equals slightly over 2% of GDP, the size of the endowment increase
plus interest on the accumulated reserves.
Figure 3c shows how this pattern is reected in the government budget and
in its stock of foreign exchange reserves. The government gains reserves that
ultimately hit the upper bound for several reasons. Firstly, there is of course
the increase in endowment income. But secondly, money demand also increases,
both on impact and then again during the anti-crisis. By the cash-in-advance
constraint this is due to an increase in consumption, and the amount of that
increase is nearly independent of the monetary regime.
The extent to which this causes reserves to increase is however a function
of the monetary regime, as discussed above in the paragraph following equation
(18). The main di¤erences between regimes consist of the degree of commitment
to let the money supply expand, or of the degree of commitment against letting
the exchange rate appreciate, in order to defend the target of monetary policy.
A monetary regime that intervenes less, and lets the exchange rate appreciate
earlier and more, thereby collecting a lower ination tax before the anti-crisis,
experiences smaller reserve gains during the entire transition to the eventual
collapse. Its anti-crisis therefore takes place later. The di¤erences between
nominal money issuance versus nominal exchange rate appreciation between
the three monetary regimes can be seen clearly in Figure 3d. We observe that
intervention is weakest under domestic ination targeting, intermediate under
CPI ination targeting, and strongest under exchange rate targeting.
We start our discussion with domestic ination targeting. Here the commit-
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ment against letting the exchange rate appreciate is weakest. The successive
reductions in the relative price of tradables are therefore accomplished by an
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate rather than by an increase in the
nontradables price. This raises the real value of existing money balances su¢ -
ciently to require much smaller additional money issuance and therefore reserve
gains to satisfy the successive increases in money demand. This is true both at
the outset and during the anti-crisis.
Under CPI ination targeting, the commitment to intervene is stronger and
reserve gains are larger. The reason is that, while permitting exchange rate
appreciation under domestic ination targeting does not directly a¤ect the tar-
geted ination rate, the same appreciation does lead to a negative deviation
from a CPI ination target. A further increase of the money supply, via central
bank purchases of foreign exchange, is therefore required to induce nontradables
ination and to limit exchange rate appreciation.
Under exchange rate targeting, the central banks commitment to intervene
is strongest, given its complete commitment against letting the exchange rate
appreciate. Therefore the entire increase in money demand, both initially and
during the anti-crisis, leads to instantaneous stock money issuance against a
stock acquisition of foreign exchange reserves, m = mM . As a result, the
upper limit on reserves is reached most quickly, after 5.5 quarters, a full 1.5
quarters earlier than under domestic ination targeting.
The bottom half of Figure 3c shows the ow budgetary implications of anti-
crises. We note that the seigniorage gains under domestic ination targeting are
indeed very much smaller than under CPI ination targeting, because additional
money issuance _m is barely su¢ cient to o¤set the drop in the ination tax "m.
The nal steady state is characterized by a reduction in the seigniorage to GDP
ratio by slightly more than one percentage point. This is of course precisely what
is required to o¤set the one percentage point (of initial GDP) higher endowment
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income and the increased interest income on a two percentage point (of initial
GDP) larger stock of reserves.
Finally we turn to Figure 3d for a closer look at the dynamics of ination.
The rst observation is that exchange rate depreciation comes to a halt at -
2.7%, meaning that the nominal interest rate, shown in Figure 3a, reaches a
new steady state of 0.3%, just above its zero lower bound. This emphasizes
that the upper reserve limit announced by the government cannot be arbitrarily
large. The zero lower bound on nominal interest rates imposes an upper limit
on foreign exchange reserves, because once reserves get beyond that limit, even
the largest feasible reduction in seigniorage will not stabilize government asset
dynamics. We have calibrated the example on the realistic premise that a mon-
etary authority would not want to drive its nominal interest rate all the way
down to zero.
The second observation pertaining to Figure 3d concerns the behavior of
nontradables ination under CPI ination targeting. In the monetary business
cycle literature it is generally argued that nontradables ination targeting has
advantages over CPI ination targeting in terms of stabilizing the business cycle.
But in practice some version of CPI ination targeting is still the most widely
used monetary regime. As discussed above, under this regime the central bank
ghts exchange rate appreciation prior to time  through higher money growth
that induces nontradables ination. Therefore, as long as central banks can be
described as following, at least implicitly, a version of CPI ination targeting,
an increase in the domestic component of ination would be consistent with an
incipient balance of payments anti-crisis.
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5 Conclusion
This paper addresses a relatively new phenomenon for many emerging markets,
a concern either by the government or by nancial markets with excessive rather
than insu¢ cient government foreign exchange reserves, often accompanied by
exchange rate appreciation and higher domestic ination. The paper explores
the nature of the underlying scal problem and its dependence on the monetary
regime.
We show that one way to understand these episodes is by looking at them
through the lens of the literature on rst-generation balance-of-payments crises.
The major di¤erence is that the crises, or rather the anti-crises, that concern
us feature an upper rather than a lower limit on foreign exchange reserves.
Moreover, this upper limit is not arbitrary but rather depends on the ability of
seigniorage adjustments to stabilize asset dynamics. That ability encounters its
natural limit in the desire of the monetary authority to stay away from the zero
lower bound on nominal interest rates.
We have shown that the end-phase of such anti-crises is characterized by
an economic boom accompanied by a further acceleration in the accumulation
of foreign exchange reserves, and by nominal interest rates approaching their
zero lower bound. While exchange rate depreciation drops sharply at that time,
domestic ination can rise sharply if the government targets CPI ination. Mon-
etary regimes that imply the strongest commitment to intervene in the foreign
exchange market to prevent exchange rate appreciation, such as exchange rate
targeting and to a lesser extent CPI ination targeting, experience the most
rapid reserve accumulation and therefore the quickest onset of the anti-crisis.
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Figure 2a: Chinas Total Reserves (Jan 2008 onwards)
Source: Bloomberg
Figure 2b: Chinas Holding of U.S. Treasuries (Jan 2008 onwards)
Source: United States Treasury
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Technical Appendix
Too Much of a Good Thing? On the E¤ects of Limiting
Foreign Reserve Accumulation
1
1 INTRODUCTION
The following note rst derives the conditions characterizing the economys
competitive equilibrium, and then outlines the nested shooting algorithm we
use to compute the solution paths of the model.
1.1 Competitive Equilibrium
1.1.1 Household FOC
The households maximization problem is:
Max
Z 1
0

 ln
h

1
 (cTt )
 1
 + (1  ) 1 (cNt )
 1

i 
 1

+ (1  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e rtdt
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Z 1
0

wtht + r
kT
t k
T + rk
N
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
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+ itmt
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
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
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 (cTt )
 1
 + (1  ) 1 (cNt )
 1

i
(1)
Then we get the following FOC:
 FOC for Tradables Consumption cTt :

ct
h

1
 (cTt )
 1
 + (1  ) 1 (cNt )
 1

i 
 1 1

1
 (cTt )
  1

=  (1 + it) , or

Dt

1
 (cTt )
  1 =  (1 + it)
cTt =
 

1

 (1 + it)Dt
!
(2)
 FOC for Nontradables Consumption cNt :
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 MRS between cTt and cNt :

1  
 1

(cTt )
  1 = et(cNt )
  1

1  


cTt = e
 
t c
N
t
cTt =


1  

cNt
et

(3)
 FOC for Labor ht:
1  
1  ht = wt (4)
1.1.2 Firm FOC
 Tradable Goods:
yTt =
 
kT
T  
hTt
1 T
(5)
 
1  T kT
hTt
T
= wt (6)
T

hTt
kT
1 T
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T
t
 Nontradable Goods:
yNt =
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kN
N  
hNt
1 N
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 
1  NkN
hNt
N
= etwt (8)
N

hNt
kN
1 N
= etr
kN
t
 Notes:
wt =Wt=Et is the real wage in terms of tradables.
The real returns on the two capital stocks rk
T
t and r
kN
t are similarly
expressed in terms of tradables. Their FOC are redundant.
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1.1.3 Market Clearing and Resource Constraints
 Cash-in-Advance Constraint:
mt = 

cTt +
cNt
et

(9)
 Nontradables Market Clearing:
cNt = y
N
t (10)
 Current Account:
_ft = rft + y
T
t + dt   cTt (11)
 Government Flow Budget Constraint:
_xt = rxt + _mt + "tmt + dt   gt (12)
1.1.4 CPI Price Index and Ination Rates
 Aggregate price index:
Pt =

 (Et)
1 
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 We obtain the following dynamic equation, which will be used as one of
the transition equations of our dynamic system:

et
et
=


1   e
1 
t + 1

("t   t) (13)
 To get a relationship between ination rates we again use _et=et = "t Nt :
(1  )  "t   Nt  =  e1 t + (1  ) ("t   t)
 We obtain the following relationship, which will be used to dene the
relationships between ination rates at discrete jumps:
t
 
e1 t + (1  )

= e1 t "t + (1  )Nt (14)
1.2 Monetary Rules
1.2.1 The Rules
 Monetary rule for Exchange Rate Targeting (ET):
Et = E0+e
"t : (15)
 Monetary rule for CPI Ination Targeting (CPIT):
iPt = r + "t + 
P (Pt   ~Pt) ; (16)
~Pt = P0+e
t : (17)
 Monetary rule for Domestic Ination Targeting (DIT):
iPNt = r + "t + 
PN (PNt   ~PNt ) ; (18)
~PNt = P
N
0+e
N t : (19)
1.2.2 Interpretation of the two IT Rules
1. They imply, together with UIP, exact price level targeting:
Pt = ~Pt 8t = 0 + (20)
PNt =
~PNt 8t = 0+ (21)
2. The denition of the target price level as starting from time 0+ allows for
initial price level jumps without a¤ecting the interest rate, i.e. the key in
going from time 0  to time 0+ is monetary accommodation alone.
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1.3 Key Resource Constraints
Two aggregate constraints will be imposed during the following iteration pro-
cedures to ensure consistency of dynamic solution paths with
 aggregate solvency vis-a-vis the rest of the world.
 the upper bound on government foreign exchange reserves x.
These two constraints will be used to pin down two unknowns and one additional
variable implied by these unknowns:
 The initial jump in exchange rate depreciation "0.
 The length of time  until foreign exchange reserves reach their upper
bound.
 The implied value for the multiplier .
The variables "0 and  are required to solve for the initial conditions of the
economy. The procedure involves a nested loop over these two variables that
ensures they are consistent with the two aggregate constraints.
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The resource constraints are as follows:
 Economys resource constraint:
f0 +
Z 
0
 
yTt + dt

e rtdt+
e r
r
 
yT + d

=
Z 
0
cTt e
 rtdt +
e r
r
cT :
(22)
 Governments resource constraint:
(x0 +4x0) er +
Z
0
( _ms + "sms   gs) er( s)ds = x = x : (23)
There is also a time 0 resource transfer that depends on whether the government
allows the nominal money supply to jump at that time to accommodate changes
in real money demand. We can decompose a change in real money balances
into a portion that is due to jumps in the exchange rate at time 0, mE0 , and
another portion that is due to increases in demand for nominal balances at the
new exchange rate, mM0 :
m0+  m0  = mE0 +mM0 ; (24)
mE0 =M0 (
1
E0+
  1
E0 
) ; (25)
mM0 =
(M0+  M0 )
E0+
=
dM0
E0+
: (26)
These two components have di¤erent implications for the evolution of foreign
exchange reserves x. The exchange rate induced component (25) does not have
any e¤ect on foreign exchange reserves on impact, but it a¤ects reserves over
time as it changes the amount of seigniorage the government needs to raise to
service its liabilities. The other component (26) , however, results in an inow
of foreign exchange reserves to the central bank at time 0:
x0+   x0  = mM0 : (27)
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2 OVERVIEW OF THE ITERATION PROCE-
DURE
We rst solve for the initial steady state of the economy, using the time subscript
0  for that period. Starting from time 0, the government receives increased
endowments d > d0  = 0. This is inconsistent with the continuing zero ination
(or exchange rate depreciation) target at the inherited level of foreign exchange
reserves. There are level jumps in some variables at time 0, and we therefore
refer to the moment immediately after the announcement of the new policy as
0+. To compute the paths of all variables until and after the end of the zero
ination regime, we adopt (i) a nested shooting algorithm for the CPI and DIT
ination targeting cases because these cases involve complicated transitions to
a new steady state, and (ii) a simultaneous equation system solution for the ET
exchange rate targeting case, which involves step paths for all variables.
2.1 General Strategy for Ination Targeting
As both  and " jump at time 0+, we need to adopt the following general
strategy:
1. Solve the system again at 0+ based on guesses about the magnitude of
those jumps.
2. Use the 0+ values to initialize our computation of dynamic transitions.
3. Check the consistency of the resulting dynamic paths with the two aggre-
gate resource constraints (22) and (23).
4. Start again at (i) with updated guesses if the consistency conditions are
not satised.
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2.2 Specic Procedure
Specically, we adopt the following procedure:
1. Step 1: Solve for all variables at time 0 .
2. Outside loop over initial guess for "(b)0 .
 We make an initial guess of the jump in exchange rate depreciation
"
(b)
0 .
 b means the bth round of iterations over "0.
 In general the initial jumps will be extremely close to zero, which
causes numerical challenges. For this reason, our updating of the
guess for "(b)0 is generally done manually.
3. Inside loop over initial guess for (bi) , which depends on (4"(b)0 ; ).
 For any given guess"(b)0 , we make an additional guess of (bi)(4"(b)0 ; ).
 bi means the ith round of iterations in the loop for  that is inside
the bth outer loop of iterations over "0.
  is the nal point of the anti-crisis.
4. Step 2: For any set of values  and " in the loop, i.e. for any combination
of 4"(b)0 and (bi)(4"(b)0 ; ), we compute the values of all other variables
at time 0+
 
cT0+; c
N
0+; e0+; D0+; w0+; h
T
0+; h
N
0+; y
T
0+; y
N
0+; "0+

.
5. Step 3: Starting from these initial values, we compute the dynamic paths
of all variables.
6. Steps 4-7: We check the consistency of the computed paths with (22) and
(23). If there are discrepancies, we update 4"(b)0 and (bi)(4"(b)0 ; ) and
start again at Step 2.
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3 STEP 1: SOLVING FOR VARIABLES AT
TIME 0-
We make the following assumptions for initial consumption and net foreign
assets:
cT0  = c
N
0  = 1 ; (c
T
0 ; c
N
0 )
f0 = 0 :
Because of the time 0 current account balance equation, the nontradables market
clearing condition, and a zero government endowment, we also have:
yT0  = y
N
0  = 1 ; (y
T
0 ; y
N
0 )
e0  =


1  
 1

; (e0 )
D0  = 
1
 + (1  ) 1 : (D0 )
We assume that
hT0  + h
N
0  = hss =
1
3
: (28)
This can be combined with two further conditions derived from the production
functions and labor demands:
Prod. Fct. : 1 =
 
kT
T  
hT0 
1 T
Labor FOC:
 
1  T   kT T   hT0  T = w0 
Combined:
 
1  T  = w0 hT0  (29)
Prod. Fct. : 1 =
 
kN
N   hN0 1 N
Labor FOC:
 
1  N  kNN   hN0  N = e0 w0 
Combined:
 
1  N = e0 w0 hN0  (30)
From (29) and (30), we have
hN0  =
 
1  N
(1  T )
hT0 
e0 
Substitute this into (28) to get
hT0  =
hss
1 + (1 
N )
(1 T )
1
e0 
 (hT0 )
hN0  = hss   hT0  (hN0 )
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w0  =
 
1  T 
hT0 
(w0 )
The capital stocks consistent with output normalization at one can be computed
as follows:
kT =
 
hT0 
 T 1
T ; (kT )
kN =
 
hN0 
 N 1
N : (kN )
These two values are held constant in all subsequent calculations.
Two simultaneous equations derived from the rst order conditions for trad-
ables consumption and for labor supply can be used to solve for 0  and the
preference parameter . The latter has to be endogenously solved for so as to
be consistent with our assumption of aggregate steady state labor being equal
to 1/3, equation (28):8>><>>:

1 +

1 

 1


0  (1 + (r + "0 ))
9>>=>>;

= 1 ; (0 )
1  
0 w0 
= 1  hss : ()
The initial conditions for all ination rates are simply as follows:
"0  = N0  = 0  = 0 : ("0 ; 0 ; p0 )
Similarly, for interest rates:
iP0  = i
PN
0  = i
E
0  = r : (i
P
0 ; i
PN
0  ; i
E
0 )
We adopt the following normalization of the aggregate price level, which can
be brought about through an appropriate level of nominal money supply:
P0  = eP0  = 1 . (P0 ; eP0 )
Then a simultaneous solution of the following two equations determines the
remaining price levels E0  and PN0 :
1 =

 (E0 )
1 
+ (1  )  PN0 1  11  ; (E0 )
E0  = e0 PN0  : (P
N
0 )
Also, we have
eE0  = E0  ; ( eE0 )
~PN0  = P
N
0  : ( ~P
N
0 )
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Finally, we can solve for inital real and nominal money balances as:
m0  = cT0 (1 + e
 1
0  
1  

) ; (m0 )
n0  = cN0 (1 + e
1 
0  

1   ) ; (n0 )
M0  = E0 m0  (M0 )
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4 STEP 2: SOLVING FOR VARIABLES AT
TIME 0+ (based on iterated guess for  and
")
4.1 System of Equations
The computation is done by rst solving the following simultaneous system of
10 equations.
"0+ = 4"(b)0 ; (31)
cT0+ = c
N
0+  e 0+ 

1   ; (32)
cT0+ =
(
   1
D0+
(bi)(1 + (r + "0+))
)
; (33)
D0+ = 
1
 (cT0+)
 1
 + (1  ) 1 (cN0+)
 1
 ; (34)
yT0+ =
 
kT
T   hT0+1 T ; (35)
yN0+ =
 
kN
N   hN0+1 N ; (36) 
1  T   kT T   hT0+ T = w0+ ; (37) 
1  N  kNN   hN0+ N = e0+w0+ ; (38)
hT0+ + h
N
0+ = 1 
1  
(bi)w0+
; (39)
cN0+ = y
N
0+ : (40)
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The values of the variables at time 0+ become the initial values of the
dynamic paths in the transition period t 2 [0; ), which is computed in Step 3
below. Based on these 10 dynamic paths, the paths of a further 9 variables can
be computed in accordance with the following sets of equations. Except for the
rst two equations, (41) and (42), these equation sets di¤er depending on
(a) Our assumptions about the initial central bank accommodation of changes
in money demand.
(b) The monetary regime.
Below we therefore present initial conditions for each combination of (a)
and (b) above.
4.2 Net Foreign Assets and Real Money Balances
f0+ = f0  = 0 ; (41)
m0+ = 

cT0+ +
cN0+
e0+

: (42)
4.3 Central Bank Foreign Exchange Reserves
The results here depend on whether the central bank is assumed to accommodate
initial jumps in real money demand. We distinguish two cases:
 Full central bank accommodation of initial jump in real money demand
(smooth nominal exchange rate):
x0+   x0  = (m0+  m0 ) : (43)
 Smooth levels of targeted price variables.
x0+   x0  = M0+  M0 
E0+
: (44)
4.4 Price Variables
For price variables, initial jumps also depend on the monetary regime. The
next subsection considers the full accommodation case corresponding to (43),
and the subsection following it considers the case of smooth target price levels
corresponding to (44). The equations in each case are derived from the following
two equations for the CPI price level and CPI ination:
Pt =

 (Et)
N
+ (1  )  PNt 1  11  (45) 
e1 t + (1  )

t = (1  )Nt + e1 t "t (46)
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4.4.1 Price Variables - Full Accommodation
1. Common Equations Across Monetary Regimes: The Price Levels
E0+ = E0  ; (47)
PN0+ =
E0+
e0+
; (48)
P0+ =

 (E0+)
1 
+ (1  )  PN0+1  11  ; (49)
M0+ = m0+E0+ : (50)
2. CPIT:
0+ = 0  =  = 0 ; (51)
N0+ =

   1e
1 
0+ "0+ (follows from (46) and (51)): (52)
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3. DIT:
N0+ = 
N
0  = 
N = 0 ; (53)
0+ =
e1 0+
e1 0+ + (1  )
"0+ (follows from (46) and (53)): (54)
4. ET:
"0+ = "0  = " = 0 (this replaces (31)); (55)
0+ = 0  = 0 ; (56)
N0+ = 
N
0  = 0 : (57)
4.4.2 Price Variables - Smooth Target Price Levels
1. CPIT:
P0+ = P0  = 1 ; (58)
0+ = 0  =  = 0 ; (59)
PN0+ =
 
e1 0+ + (1  )
 1
 1 (follows from (45) and (58)); (60)
N0+ =

   1e
1 
0+ "0+ (follows from (46) and (59)); (61)
E0+ = e0+P
N
0+ ; (62)
M0+ = m0+E0+ : (63)
2. DIT:
PN0+ = P
N
0  ; (64)
N0+ = 
N
0  = 
N = 0 ; (65)
E0+ = e0+P
N
0+ ; (66)
P0+ =

 (E0+)
1 
+ (1  )  PN0+1  11  (follows from (45)); (67)
0+ =
e1 0+
e1 0+ + (1  )
"0+ (follows from (46) and (65)); (68)
M0+ = m0+E0+ : (69)
3. ET:
"0+ = "0  = " = 0 (this replaces (31)); (70)
0+ = 0  = 0 ; (71)
N0+ = 
N
0  = 0 ; (72)
E0+ = E0  ; (73)
PN0+ =
E0+
e0+
(74)
P0+ =

 (E0+)
1 
+ (1  )  PN0+1  11  (follows from (45)); (75)
M0+ = m0+E0+ : (76)
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5 STEP 3: SOLVING FOR DYNAMIC PATHS
(based on iterated guess for  and ")
Based on the same guess for  and " that was used in computing initial (time
0+) values in Step 2, we now compute the dynamic paths of all variables. Using
the values at time 0+ as initial values of a system of di¤erential equations, we
solve that system using the Runge-Kutta Method (RK4) (see Judd p. 345
for details).
5.1 CPI Targeting
 Di¤erentiate (3):

cTt
cTt
=

cNt
cNt
  

et
et
(cTt )
 Di¤erentiate (2):

cTt
cTt
=  
24 Dt
Dt
+


"t
(1 +  (r + "t))
35 ("t)
 Di¤erentiate (1):

Dt   1    1

(cTt )
 1

0@ cTt
cTt
1A+ (1  ) 1    1

(cNt )
 1

0@ cNt
cNt
1A (Dt)
 Di¤erentiate (4):

hTt +

hNt
(1  hTt   hNt )
=

wt
wt
(wt)
 Di¤erentiate (6):
 T

hTt
hTt
=

wt
wt
(hTt )
 Di¤erentiate (5):
:
yTt
yTt
= (1  T )
:
hTt
hTt
(yTt )
 Di¤erentiate (8):
 N

hNt
hNt
=

et
et
+

wt
wt
(hNt )
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 Di¤erentiate (7):
:
yNt
yNt
= (1  N )

hNt
hNt
(yNt )
 Di¤erentiate (10):

cNt
cNt
=

yNt
yNt
(cNt )
 Current Account (11):
_ft = rft + y
T
t + dt   cTt (ft)
 Government Flow Budget Constraint (12):
_xt = rxt + _mt + "tmt + dt   gt (xt)
 Cash-in-Advance (9):
_mt = 
0@ cTt +

cNt
et
  c
N
t
et

et
et
1A (mt)
 From CPI di¤erentiation (13):

et
et
=


1   e
1 
t + 1

("t   ) (et)
This is a system of 13 di¤erential equations with 13 unknown functions of
time: cTt , c
N
t , et, Dt, "t, wt, h
T
t , h
N
t , y
T
t , y
N
t , ft, xtand mt. Equation (wt) can
be replaced according to the following derivation:
 First, combine (wt) with (hNt ) and (ft):

hTt +

hNt
1  hTt   hNt
=
:
wt
wt
=  N

hNt
hNt
 


1   (et)
1 
+ 1

("t   )
 Transform this to get

hTt =
 
1  hTt   hNt
24 N hNt
hNt
 


1   (et)
1 
+ 1

("t   )
35  hNt
(77)
 Next, combine (hTt ) with (hNt ) to get:
 T

hTt
hTt
=
:
wt
wt
=  N

hNt
hNt
 


1   (et)
1 
+ 1

("t   )
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 Transform this to get:
:
hTt = h
T
t
24N
T

hNt
hNt
+
1
T


1   (et)
1 
+ 1

("t   )
35 (78)
 Combining (77) and (78) gives:
 
1  hTt   hTt
24 N hNt
hNt
 


1   (et)
1 
+ 1

("t   )
35  hNt
= hTt
24N
T

hNt
hNt
+
1
T


1   (et)
1 
+ 1

("t   )
35
 Transform this once to get:

hNt
"
 N
 
1  hTt   hNt

hNt
  1  h
T
t
hNt
N
T
#
=

1  hNt   hTt

1  1
T


1   (et)
1 
+ 1

("t   )

 Transform once again to get:

hNt =
 

1  hNt   hTt

1  1
T

h
1 + 
N
hNt

1  hNt   hTt

1  1
T
i  
1   (et)
1 
+ 1

("t   )

(79)
5.2 Domestic Ination Targeting
The system of equations is identical to that for CPI Targeting, except for the
last equation (et), which is replaced by

et
et
=
 
"t   N

: (e)
5.3 Continuity under Ination Targeting
The following argument shows that under CPI ination targeting "t must be
continuous for all t > 0 including  . The path of Et must be continuous to rule
out arbitrage opportunities, and the path of Pt is continuous by the ination
targeting policy. By (45) this means that the path of PNt is also continuous, and
therefore so is et = Et=PNt . Now assume that h
T
t is not continuous. Then by
(6) wt is discontinuous, and by (8) hNt is discontinuous. The production func-
tions (5) and (7) then imply discontinuous jumps in output. These jumps will
generally be such that the ratio yTt =y
N
t is discontinuous. The market clearing
condition for nontradables (10) and the current account (11) therefore imply
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discontinuous jumps in consumption such that cTt =c
N
t is discontinuous. But this
contradicts the continuity of et by equation (3). We therefore conclude that hTt
is continuous, and by repeating the above chain of arguments the same is true
for wt; ht; yTt ; y
N
t ; c
T
t ; c
N
t , and also for Dt. Finally, the continuity of c
T
t , c
N
t and
Dt, by the uncovered interest parity condition and (2), implies continuity of "t,
and by the real money demand conditions it implies continuity of mt, nt and
Mt. This continuity result is important for the computational solution, as it al-
lows us to construct solution paths such that all variables remain at the values
they reach at the end of the anti-crisis. A similar argument can be constructed
for domestic ination targeting.
5.4 Exchange Rate Targeting
For the exchange targeting case, all variables remain constant in [0+;  ], and
again after  , except for x and f . For this case we therefore do not use the
iterative procedure, as we only need to solve for a small number of piece-wise
constant solution paths plus the time  and the value of the multiplier . The
reader can therefore skip to Step 7 for an explanation of the computation of this
case.
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6 STEP 4: SOLVE FOR  (based on iterated
guess for  and ")
 Based on our guess for  and " (formally "(b)0 ; (bi)(4"(b)0 ; )) we have
computed a pre- solution path for each variable in Step 2 and Step 3.
We now use those paths to compute the terminal time  . We know that 
must satisfy three conditions: (i) _x = 0, (ii) x = x, and (iii) consistency
with the aggregate resource constraint (22). Checking the rst condition
is equivalent to checking (i) "m = g   d  rx.
 Steps 4 and 5 represent the inside loop over  that ensures
condition (iii) while checking "m = g  d rx. Step 6 represents
the outside loopover "0 that ensures condition (ii).
 We check "m = g  d rx by computing the path of "tmt. It can easily
be shown to be monotonically increasing in "t and therefore monotonically
increasing over time, with an initial value of zero. Let the solution for time
 be denoted as  (b
). It is given by:
 (b
) =

t : "tmt = g   d  rx
	
: (80)
7 STEP 5: ITERATE OVER 
 This step ensures that our  is consistent with the innite horizon transver-
sality condition (22) for the overall economy.
 We use the rst order condition for tradables consumption (2), the econ-
omys lifetime resource constraint (22), and the  (b
) computed in Step
4 to compute a value for , denoted as ^. This will in general not equal
the (bi) that we assumed in Steps 2-4. We therefore update our guess for
lambda as (bi+1) = f(^).
 In the simplest case, (bi+1) = ^, and we have
(bi+1) =
2664

R (b)
0
[Dt(1 + r + "t)]
 
e rtdt+ [D(b)(1 + r + "(b))]
  e r(b
)
r

f0 +
R (b)
0
 
yTt + dt

e rtdt+
 
yT
(b) + d(b
)

e r(b
)
r
3775
1

.
(81)
 We return to Step 2 and start again.
 We iterate until the (bi+1) from the (i+ 1)th iteration is the same, within
a small tolerance level, as the (bi) from the previous iteration. We call
the solution (b
)(4"(b)0 ;  (b
))), with associated anti-crisis time  (b
), and
with associated paths for all variables. The path for central bank foreign
exchange reserves fxtg1t=0+ is the basis for Step 6.
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 At this point our solution only depends on the guess for "0, which needs
to be consistent with the condition x(b) = 0.
8 STEP 6. CHECK WHETHER x (b) = x
 Using the path fxtg1t=0+ from Step 5, we check whether x(b) = x:
 If not, change the initial guess 4"(b)0 .
 Make a new guess for (bi) also.
 Return to Step 2 and start again.
 Repeat until x
(b)(4"(b)0 ;(b)(4"(b)0 ;(b)))
= x.
 Theoretically, the value of 4"(b)0 can be solved directly using the system
of equations at time 0+. However, this generates computational problems
because this value is generally extremely close to zero. We therefore nd
the solution for 4"(b)0 using a manualgrid search.
9 STEP 7: DETERMINE VALUES AFTER T
9.1 Ination Targeting (CPI and DIT)
The above conditions ensure consistency of values at  with (i) "m = g  d rx,
(ii) x = x (which together imply consistency with the government resource
constraint (23)), and (iii) consistency with the aggregate resource constraint
(22). Values after  can therefore simply be set equal to those at  .
9.2 Exchange Rate Targeting
Unlike in the previous two cases, there are jumps in the variables at time T
for the exchange targeting case. We therefore need to solve for the values of
the variables after time T at the new steady state. We compute all equilib-
rium quantities in one shot by solving the following system of 24 simultaneous
equations:
1. The levels equations at time 0+:
"0+ = " ; ("0+)
cT0+ = c
N
0+  e 0+ 

1   ; (e0+)
cT0+ =
(
   1
D0+(1 + (r + "0+))
)
; (c0+)
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D0+ = 
1
 (cT0+)
 1
 + (1  ) 1 (cN0+)
 1
 ; (D0+)
yT0+ =
 
kT
T   hT0+1 T ; (y0+)
yN0+ =
 
kN
N   hN0+1 N ; (y0+) 
1  T   kT T   hT0+ T = w0+ ; (`0+) 
1  N  kNN   hN0+ N = e0+w0+ ; (`0+)
hT0+ + h
N
0+ = 1 
1  
w0+
; (w0+)
cN0+ = y
T
0+ ; (c0+)
m0+ = 

cT0+ +
cN0+
e0+

: (m0+)
2. The levels equations at time  :
" =
g   d  rx
m
; (" )
cT = c
N
  e  

1   ; (e )
cT =
(
   1
D(1 + (r + " ))
)
()
D = 
1
 (cT )
 1
 + (1  ) 1 (cN )
 1
 (D )
yT =
 
kT
T  
hT
1 T
(yT )
yN =
 
kN
N  
hN
1 N
(yN ) 
1  T   kT T  hT  T = w (hT ) 
1  N  kNN  hN  N = ew (hN )
hT + h
N
 = 1 
1  
w
(w )
cN = y
N
 (c
N
 )
m = 

cT +
cN
e

: (m )
3. Resource constraints consistency conditions:
 Lifetime Budget Constraint: 
1  e r  yT0+ + d0+   cT0++ e r  yT + d   cT  = 0 : (cT )
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 Central Bank Foreign Exchange Reserves (x0  and m0  are known
from Step 1):
(x0  +m0+  m0 ) er + (m  m0+) + e
r   1
r
 
d  g = x : ()
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